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Abstract
This paper deals with marketing strategy decisions regarding the
number of products a firm may need to introduce at a segment in order
to prevent competitive entry, as well as the positioning of such
products. Our analysis considers conditions of changing segment size
either through growth or decline in demand. We illustrate that fewer
properly-positioned products are necessary for pre-emption than the
segment can support. We also show that, if uncertainty is present,
risk-averse managers will have more products in the segment than
necessary. Further, our results are generalized to an extremely broad
class of consumer demand functions.

1. Introduction
The majority of the analytical marketing strategy literature is
oriented towards 1) helping a marketing manager's decisions at the
level of choosing either a differentiated strategy or a concentrated
strategy, 2) providing models for choosing the optimal new product con-
cept for entry into an existing market and 3) helping a manager choose
the optimal allocation of resources to various marketing activities to
support either an existing brand, or a new brand. But there are im-
portant decisions other than these that are faced by a marketing
strategist. The decisions that we deal with in this paper are (i) How
many products should a firm introduce for (at) a segment in order to
prevent competitive entry? (ii) Where should such brands be
positioned? (iii) When faced with growth in consumer demand is it
sufficient to reposition existing brands, or should new brands be
entered? and (iv) When faced with waning consumer demand, is it suf-
ficient to reposition existing brands or should brands be deleted (if
so, when?)?
This paper deals with these decision questions by developing a
model of a market where the objective of the marketing managers is to
maximize profits as well as to monopolize the demand of a segment.
In doing so, we extend theoretical understanding of product-market
structures and provide insights useful to managerial decision making.
We begin with a brief description of the theoretical literature
(Section 2) upon which we build our work. We then describe our model
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of segment level strategy. Section 3 describes our model of the
segment level market structure and consumer behavior. Our analysis
based on this model is presented in Section 4. This analysis is first
shown for some specific segment sizes followed by our rules for more
general cases. Section 5 discusses and demonstrates generalizability of
our results beyond some assumptions of Section 3. This paper then
concludes with a summary of our major results and a statement of some
possible questions for further research.
2. Brief Review of Literature
In the literature on competitive marketing strategy, choice of the
pattern of market coverage (viz., the product/market concentration,
product specialization, market specialization, selective specializa-
tion, full coverage patterns of Abell (1980, Ch. 8, pp. 13-17)) has
been a key issue. This literature assumes that while a firm may have
several brands in a market, it should (implicitly stated) have no more
than one brand targeted at any specific segment. The market segmen-
tation literature (e.g., Winter (1979), Moorthy (1984), Wind (1978))
aids a manager in the design of specific marketing-mix strategies for
segments—allowing no more than one product per segment.
Brand proliferation (multiple products aimed at the same segment)
is a strategy that has been long practiced by some very successful
firms, e.g., Procter and Gamble and Coca-Cola. In fact, Mitsubishi
recently introduced three brands at the small car segment simultaneously!
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The literature on dominant firms, on the other hand, does focus on
multi-product strategies as non-price competitive options. The state
of the art (White, 1983) here provides very general guidelines to
managers, which are very useful, but does not provide a rigorous
theoretical basis.
In summary, the existing marketing literature does not currently
have arf analytical framework within which a marketing strategist can
assess the segments of a new market, determine the number and positions
of new brands that would be needed to completely dominate a pre-
specified market segment. Further, as such a market segment grows or
shrinks, the decisions of whether to reposition (and if so, how?)
existing brands or to introduce/delete brands (where/which?) become
important, and an analytic basis for such is needed.
The facility location problem in economics seems to be the original
source of analytic positioning theories. The famous duopoly location
model of Hotelling (1929), and the plant location model of Losch (1954)
form the basis of much of the subsequent work in location or positioning
in economics, including that of Prescott and Visscher (1977), Schmalansee
(1978), and Eaton and LIpsey (1979). Prescott and Visscher (1977)
construct an equilibrium model of firms in which the firms locate them-
selves sequentially in a market. Once positioned they are not allowed
to reposition. Further, all firms are assumed to be able (with perfect
foresight) to correctly predict the influence its decisions will have
on the firms yet to enter. Their solution shows the equilibrium posi-
tions that may be used by the first entrant to establish a monopoly.
They, however, do not allow for product repositioning or for market
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growth. Neither do they derive the minimum number of brands a firm
needs to enter to pre-empt the market.
An application of competitive spatial location modeling is pro-
vided in Schmalansee (1978). In the context of the 1970 ready-to-eat
breakfast cereal industry, he shows that brand proliferation was an
effective entry deterring strategy. His analysis, however, does not
provide the marketing strategist with guidelines for choosing the mini-
mum number of products and their positions for pre-emption.
Eaton and Lipsey (1979) consider a spatial market with increasing
market demand. Under such conditions, they show that existing firms
should pre-empt the market by establishing new plants before the time
when it would pay new firms to enter. Given that they study plant
location, they also do not allow for repositioning.
Using the rich analytical support provided by the economics
literature, this paper provides an analytical theory base for prac-
ticing market strategists to consider in their product market planning
process, and for researchers in the area of product management theory.
3. Model of Segment Level Market
In developing our analysis of segment level product positioning
strategies we make some assumptions regarding competitive behavior,
behavior of costs, and the nature of consumer demand distributions.
These assumptions are similar to those made in the literature pre-
viously cited. In Section 5 we treat the issue of relaxing these
assumptions and their impact on our results.
Let us consider a marketing strategist pondering about a market
segment. He has arrived at a segmentation of the market by aggregating
consumers into various segments, each segment displaying relative
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homogeneity of preferences on a set of salient product characteristics
Within a segment, consumers are heterogeneous with respect to certain
other product characteristics.
He wishes to introduce a set of products for this segment that is
both jointly "optimal" and will dissuade competitors from entering
their products (by making such competitive entries unprofitable). The
strategist is planning for a time horizon over which average total
demand is assumed to be constant. When such demand changes the strate-
gist is assumed to plan anew. We take the vantage point of the strate-
gist who enters the first product(s) for this segment. Others are
treated as followers, who react by positioning products (if at all)
based on the actions of the leader.
Consumer demand is assumed to be a function of product charac-
teristics. In our analysis we consider the case of a product class
defined on one characteristic (or two related characteristics). We
assume that price is one of the salient market segmentation variables.
An example is that of a theme park company which used price as a
2dimension for segmenting (Stumpf, 1976). Each product has associated
with it a fixed cost (L). We assume that this fixed cost is the same
for all firms (whether leader or follower) and for all products.
Without any loss of generality it is assumed that the range of
-KL KL
characteristic values have been rescaled to be in [ ~-ji~oJ • Consumers
are associated with levels of this characteristic and are assumed to
buy one unit each. The distribution of consumers is given by the
—KL KL
rescaled density f(a) = 1, where —j <, a <. ~j • Each consumer buys
the product positioned closest to him. The total demand for this
3
segment" is, therefore, KL.
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Profit for a product for a given period is given by n = CM * a * KL
- L, (where CM, the unit contribution margin, is assumed to be a
constant, equal to one for ease of exposition, and a is the market
share for that product).
For each period, the leader's strategist is assumed to estimate
the segment demand KL. With L as the fixed cost per product, and a
unit contribution of one, the maximum number of products that may be
supported by this segment (i.e., its size) is K. The estimate of K
that the leader obtains from his estimation of KL is K, , termed esti-
mate of segment size. We assume that such estimation is done for only
one period at a time, and further allow for estimation errors causing
K, to be different from K.
The leader is assumed to have perfect foresight regarding the
optimal positions chosen by the follower given its own actions (posi-
tions chosen). So, given its estimation of segment size K, and the
number of products it wishes to enter, the leader can compute both its
optimal positions and those of the followers, who enter and then wish to
pre-empt any further entry. Eaton and Lipsey (1979), Prescott and
Visscher (1977), Lane (1980), Sudharshan and Kumar (1984) and Kumar and
Sudharshan (1984) show how such computations may be performed. The
profits that accrue to such positions are also known and it is further
assumed that only products that would produce positive profits are
4feasible for entry.
In the next section we show the entry-deterring brand positions
for various sizes of the market and also analyze alternative positioning
options that brand managers with varying perspectives are restricted to.
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A.O Analysis
In this section, based on the modeling assumptions of the previous
section, we analytically derive the entry deterring product positions,
under varying market segment sizes (K). We show that the number of such
products necessary and sufficient for pre-emption is lesser than the seg-
K+l
ment size K. Specifically, when K is integral, it is equal to ( ) for
odd values of K, and is equal to (—) for even values of K. For non-
integral values of K, the above rule holds using the next higher
integer to K instead of K. We also analyze the change in brand posi-
tioning, as needed, as the segment demand changes. Brand managers are
thought of as having one of the three following perspectives: (i)
naive, i.e.
,
that of not considering competitor action, (ii) com-
petitive and assuming research information about segment size K to
be perfect, and (iii) competitive and assuming only imperfect research
information about K.
4.1 Product Positions
We discuss the pre-emptive product strategies for five special
cases with < K <_ 1, 1 < K _< 2, 2 < K _< 3, 3<K_<4, 4<K_<6, and
two general cases with K = (2N-1), i.e., odd, and K=2N, where N is any
positive integer. The special cases are used to draw the reader's
attention to the logic of our deductions, and to provide an intuitive
feeling for the change in the pre-emptive product positions as K
changes (segment demand grows)—thus providing a dynamic perspective
to the discussion.
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Case 1: Segment size: < K <_ 1
Obviously, the segment cannot support any product. When K = 1, if
only one product is entered, it captures L units of demand (i.e., that
of the entire segment, K = 1), with a contribution of $L. Its fixed
cost is $L. Therefore, it is unprofitable to enter even one product.
Case 2: 1 < K
_< 2
Similar to the argument in Case 1, this segment can support at
most one product profitably (if K=2 and two products are entered
"optimally," they will both share the market and make no profits).
The position of this product can be deduced from the perspective of
entry deterring behavior.
The entry deterring (profitable) positioning is to place the pro-
duct anywhere in the internal (-d,d) such that d = (1 - y)L. Figure 1
illustrates this solution.
Only Suitable Interval
f
-KL
2
"(1 " 2> L (1 " Y>L
KL
2
Figure 1: Case 2: Product Positions
Suppose the strategist positions his product at a point x < -(1 - y)L>
then the segment size to the right-hand-side of this product is
greater than L, and hence a product positioned just to the right of
this one will be profitable. The upper limit (1 - y)L can be estab-
lished similarly.
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Intuitively, a strategist might under this case prefer, even
without this analysis, to position his product at 0, i.e., the center
of the segment. This symmetry preserving strategy is not the only
entry deterring strategy since any product position in the range
derived is also entry deterrent. Let us now denote the non central
positioning as asymmetric strategy.
As the segment size (K) grows from 1 towards 2, the entry
deterring positioning interval shrinks towards the center. The limit
of this interval (K=2) is exactly the symmetric strategy—one of posi-
tioning at the center.
Any product position using asymmetric strategy involves reposi-
tioning the brand towards the center with segment growth. This repo-
sitioning may be either continuous or in discrete steps. The symmetric
strategy involves no repositioning with market growth (as long as K < 2)
Case 3: 2 < K
_< 3
The segment cannot support three products, but can it be pre-empted
with just one product? The answer to this is no. Considering Figure
1, at the limit (when K=2) , the only pre-emptive strategy is posi-
tioning one product at the center (0). When K > 2, a product posi-
tioned immediately to the left or right of the center is profitable.
This indicates the need for at least another product for segment
pre-emption.
The entry deterring profitable positioning strategies with two
products are:
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i) Symmetric strategy of positioning two products, each at a
V
distance d from the center, where d lies in the interval (L(y -1) ,L)
-d +d
KL KL
2 2
Figure 2: Case 3: Symmetry Strategy Positions
K 4
Suppose d < L(y -1), then a new brand positioned immediately to
the left of brand at -d, or immediately to the right of the one at d,
will be profitable. Therefore d < L(y -1) is not entry deterrent.
Suppose d > L, then a new brand if positioned immediately to the
right of the one at -d, or immediately to the left of +d will be pro-
fitable. This implies d > L is not pre-emptive. Suppose d is in the
interval (L(-~- -1),L), then the positioning a new brand immediately to
the left of the brand at -d , or immediately to the right of the brand
at d leads to less less than $L of contribution and hence is unprofit-
able and thus infeasible. Similarly any new brand positioned in the
interval (-d,d) will achieve a contribution of $d . Since d < L, this
is also unprofitable. This proves that the entry deterring symmetric
positioning strategy is to choose a d such that d lies in (L(y -1),L),
(ii) Asymmetric Strategy of positioning two products is to posi-
tion one at a distance d to the left of the center, and the other at
a distance d„ to the right of the center, where d..
,
d„ satisfy the
following conditions:
and
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d
] _
> (| -DL, d 2 > (| -1)L
d
1
+ d
2
< 2L.
1
KL
2
-d.
KL
2
Figure 3: Case 3: A Symmetric Strategy Position
The first two conditions ensures that entry to the left of -d
1
and
to the right of d~ will be infeasible. The third condition ensures
the infeasibility of an entrant in the interval (-d.,d 9 ).
Note that even as K increases to its upper limit 3, both sym-
metric and asymmetric strategies are feasible and distinct from one
another.
Case 4: 3 < K <_ 4
The segment can theoretically support three but not four products.
The question is, "Do we need three products for pre-emption?" The
answer is no—two properly positioned products suffice. The arguments
used in Case 3 for both the symmetric and asymmetric strategies hold
for this case also, and thus, there exist symmetric and asymmetric
entry deterring positions. These positions are the same as derived
in Case 3.
Case 4 strategies are distinguished from those of Case 3 in that
as the segment size grows to the limit (K=4) , the assymetric strategy
-Im-
positions converge to the symmetric ones. At K=4, the entry deterring
positions are unique and are such that each product is positioned at a
distance L from the center.
Case 5: 4 < K
_< 6
Three products are necessary and sufficient to pre-empt entry by
another product for this case. The symmetric strategy is to position
a product at the center, and the other two products, each at a dis-
tance d on either side of the center where d lies in the interval
(L(| -1), 2L).
1 i i
KL
2
-d
KL
2
Figure 4: Case 5: Symmetric Strategy Positions
The asymmetric strategy is to position the three brands as per Figure
5, such that d
3
> d
2
> d±t and -^ - |d 3 1 < L, ^| - |d | < L, (d^d.^ < 2L,
and (d
3
~d
2
) < 2L.
1 1 1
KL
2
KL
2
Figure 5: Case 5: Asymmetric Strategy Positions
The rationale for these positions, as in Case 3, is to pre-empt entry
to the sides of the extreme brands and in between any pair of adjacent
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brands. Once again, as in Case 4, the limiting asymmetric positions
coincide with the limiting symmetric positions as K * 6. This unique
pre-empting strategy is positioning one brand at the center, and the
other two each distance 2L away from the center on either side of it.
General Case 1: K = (2N-1), N any positive integer
The maximum number of products that can theoretically be supported
by this segment is (2N-2). But, it is both necessary and sufficient
to enter only N products to pre-empt this entire segment.
The entry deterring product positions, whether symmetric or asym-
metric, need to satisfy the following conditions: (i) the distance
between the corresponding end point of the segment should be <^ L, and
(ii) the distance between any two adjacent brands should be <_ 2L.
In this case, both asymmetric and symmetric strategies are
feasible and distinct. The positioning rules are similar to those in
Prescott and Visscher (1977, example 2).
General Case 2: K = 2N, N any positive integer
While (2N-1) products can be apparently supported by this segment,
only _N are needed for segment pre-emption. The pre-emptive positions
must satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) of General Case 1.
In this case, as different from the previous one, only symmetric
strategies are pre-emptive.
As has been shown in the special cases 1 through 5, the pre-
emptive brand positions change as the segment size changes. Figure 6
shows a plot of the number of products needed for pre-emption for
various values of K.
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5-
4-
3-
2
!••
(0 0)
» ' m
12 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Figure 6: N vs. K
As can be seen, the number of products needed jumps at even values of
K, which we will term critical stages of the segment size. When the
number of products N changes, the corresponding pre-emptive positions also
change. When N is odd, there is always a product positioned at the center
of the segment. When N is even, there is no product at the segment's
center. This seems to suggest a cyclic pattern of product positioning
at size (K) interval limits as shown in Figure 7. As can also be seen
N=
+ 1
I 4. 2
4, I 4. 3
+ + + + 4
+ +• + + + 5
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5
4,4,4,4,4,4.4, 7
K=
2-e
4-e
6-e
8-e
10-e
12-e
14-e
where c is a very
small positive scalar,
Figure 7: Positioning Cycle
from Figure 7, as the segment's size moves from one critical stage to
the next, one additional product becomes sufficient and necessary for
pre-emption. Further, with such movement, this additional product can
be at the center with a spreading out (repositioning outwards) of the
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existing products (for odd values of N) , or, the deletion of the
central product, and addition of two extreme (at the flanks) products,
along with a squeezing in (or repositioning) of the existing products
(for even values of N)
.
Given these entry-deterring product positions possible for various
segment sizes, let us now consider the possible choices of strategists
with differing perspectives.
4.2 Managerial Choices Under Varying Perspectives
We consider three types of brand managers and analyze the dynamic
positioning choices they will make. We proceed expecting the incumbent
strategist to have the incentive and the capability to introduce/
withdraw products as the segment size changes.
Case A: The "strategist" is assumed to be of the naive type (an
unlikely situation) using one of two decision rules in positioning the
maximum number of products supportable by the market segment. Rule 1
stipulates that he randomly position these products. Rule 2, that he
uniformly distribute these products across the segment.
Following the first rule, he may or may not pre-empt the segment.
If by chance a subset of his products occupy all the pre-emptive posi-
tions, his other products will suffer losses, but in the aggregate he
is making profits. Following Rule 2, he always pre-empts entry into
8
the segment.
In both cases it must be noted that the strategy followed is
suboptimal, since fewer products correctly positioned are necessary
for pre-emption.
Case B: This strategist is assumed to actively seek pre-emptive
positions (i.e., pre-emption of competitive entry). The information
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needed by him is segment size K, which he assumes to be perfectly
known. His choice of pre-emptive positions follows the general rules
discussed in Section 4.1.
In a segment with changing size K, he has the option of choosing
between two positioning strategies:
1) Repositioning his brands when size K passes through the criti-
i
cal stages as dictated by the general rules, as well as when size
changes without crossing any critical limits. For example, in Case 2
of Section 4.1, the strategist positions the product (only one is
required) asymmetrically and has to constantly reposition it as K
approaches the upper critical stage (at K=2) . As K crosses this cri-
tical stage, he has to introduce the second product, and choose
corresponding pre-emptive positions as per Case 3.
This strategy runs the risk of allowing competitive entry every
time it calls for repositioning. This arises due to the risk of
underestimation of K.
2) Repositioning his brands only when critical stages are crossed,
and positioning for the next expected critical stage if the segment is
growing, and for the critical stage just crossed if the segment is
contracting. For example, in Case 2 (1<K<2) this strategist would
have positioned his product at the center, which becomes the limit as K
tends to 2; in other words he opts to position for the critical stage
next to be crossed for a growing segment. When this critical stage is
passed, he would opt to choose the positions appropriate for the next
critical stage, i.e., K=4. On the other hand, in a contracting segment,
starting with 2 < K < 4 (i.e., he has positioned appropriately for the
-17-
critical stage K=4) , when the segment contracts and passes critical
stage K=2, he would position appropriate to K=2, the critical stage
just crossed.
This strategy, again, could lead to competitive entry, if the true
value of K is higher than that "known" by the strategist.
Case C: This strategist not only actively seeks pre-emptive posi-
tions, but also considers that his information regarding K is imper-
fect. Such a strategist would always position his brand(s) for the
next critical stage to be passed if the segment is growing, and for
the critical stage just passed for a contracting segment (just as in
case B-2).
However, he is different from the Case B-2 strategist in that he
considers the possibility of misestimating K. Let us say that his
estimation of K is such that K lies (with a certain level of confi-
dence) within K.. + zo . In a changing segment, whether expanding or
J. ~~ K
contracting, new pre-emptive positions will be chosen only when
K. + za crosses a critical stage. In other words, he will introduce a
1 K.
new product in a growing segment, earlier than necessary for pre-
emption. And, in a contracting segment, he will delete a product only
after it is no longer necessary. In following such a repositioning
strategy, he foregoes some profits in return for security against com-
petitive entry.
This phenomenon indicates that there may be periods for which such a
pre-emptive strategist will have more products serving a segment than
is necessary (the length of such periods is dependent on the risk that
this strategist is willing to assume). This "excess-capacity" type
observation is similar to the conclusions of Eaton and Lipsey (1979).
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The results so far have been based on certain assumptions outlined
in Section 3. We will next consider the robustness of our results when
some of these assumptions are relaxed.
5.0 Extensions of Basic Model
In this section we consider three extensions
—
(i) the relaxation
of the assumption of uniform distribution for the consumer density
function, (ii) allowing for synergistic interactions between brands,
and (iii) allowing the "potential entrant's" fixed cost to be different
from the leader's.
5 .1 Consumer density Function
In Section 3, we assumed that the consumer density function
—KL KLf(a) = 1, i.e., uniformly distributed over the segment space [ —j,—~]
(see footnote 1 for further clarification). Consider an arbitrary con-
sumer density function F(a), such that
KL
/
2
F(a)dct = KL
KL
2
9i.e., the segment demand is still KL.
Our results still hold for any such F(a). The interpretation of
the pre-emptive positions change in this case. Previously (with
f(a)=l) the rules for positioning the brands involved "distances"
-KL KL
of multiples of L along segment space [ —~,—~J (see general cases in
Section 4.1). Now, the product positions are given by those points in
—KL KL
[
—j,—j] such that the corresponding areas under the consumer density
distribution are the appropriate multiples of L. For example, let us
consider a segment with demand 1.5L (i.e.,- K=1.5). If the consumer
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density function is f(ot)=l (i.e., uniform), the pre-emptive product
can be positioned anywhere in the range (-0.25L, 0.25L), as depicted in
Figure 8A. If the density function is
8 ., 3L . . 3L
3
lf " — <«<- g-
F(a) ^
4 .. 31 . , 3L9 lf " g-<« <—
the pre-emptive product can be positioned anywhere in the interval
-9L -3L
[ -r-T-,—=] . This is illustrated in Figure 8B.lb o
f(*>
Fto)
•3L
4 it,
Area (abdg)
Area (cefh)
-3L
Figure 8A
Figure 8B
Area (abdh) = L
Area (cdefgi) = L
3L
4
Figure 8: Positioning with Varying Density Function
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5.2 Synergy
In Section 3, we assumed that every product that was positioned
incurred a fixed cost of constant magnitude L. This may not be so if,
for example, there exists some synergy between these pre-emptive pro-
ducts. Let this synergy be such that the closer two adjacent products
are, the lesser the fixed cost incurred by each. In such a case, pre-
emptive positioning should still follow the general rules of Section
4.1. In addition, the positions should be chosen to maximize the
effects of synergy, i.e., reducing the adjacent brand distances to the
minimum permissible under the general rules.
For example, consider Case 3, Section 4.1, where 2 < K
_< 3. The
corresponding symmetric strategy is shown in Figure 2. The two prod-
ucts could be positioned in any manner as long as the distance d from
the center to either lies in the interval (L(~—1), D • With synergy,
the leeway in choosing d disappears and a unique symmetric strategy
with d=L (-r- -1) is pre-emptive and optimal.
In return for the benefit from the effects of synergy, the stra-
tegist has to assume the responsibility for repositioning the existing
brands, even when the segment size K does not cross any critical
stages. Further, the strategist with a perspective as in Case C of
Section 4.2, who could otherwise reposition his brands only at criti-
cal stages, is forced to constantly reposition to obtain the fruits of
synergy. Such repositioning magnifies the risk of misestimating K.
This strategist in repositioning will trade off some of the synergy
benefits against the risk, of competitive entry (due to misestimation
of K and therefore non-pre-emptive positioning on his part).
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5.3 Differential Fixed Cost for Entrants
We consider the case where the potential entrant may have a fixed
cost L (per product) different from that (L) of the pre-emptor. In
this case, the pre-emptor, by modeling the total segment demand to be
KL can still pre-empt by using the general rules of Section 4.1. The
rules have to be modified, only to the extent that L should be sub-
stituted for L, wherever L occurs. The minimum number of products
required for pre-emption are still the same as in Figure 6.
While such positions may pre-empt entry they need not be jointly
profitable. The condition for profitability is that the total segment
demand KL should support the N pre-emptive products each with a fixed
N
cost L, i.e., KL - NL > 0. This implies that L > (—)L for both
1 IK
pre-emption and profitability. From Figure 6, it is clear that the
N
ratio — has an upper bound of 1, when N=K=1 , and a strict lower bound
K
of -r- when K is even. This implies that when a competitor has a fixed
cost L <. y, then no profitable pre-emptive positions exist. When
L
l
L >^ L, the pre-emptive positions are profitable. For any -
—
, such that
L
1
1/2 < -— < 1, there exists a unique segment size K* beyond which pre-
emptive positioning is profitable. For values of K < K*
,
profitable
L
lpre-emption critically depends on K and the ratio -—
.
L
l 3
For example, when -— = -r-» the condition for profitability becomes
N 3
— < -r. This is true for all K > 4 (see Figure 6). In the interval
o
2 < K <^ 4, where N=2 , the profitability condition requires K > —
.
Q
Therefore, for 2 < K <^ —
,
pre-emption is not profitable. From Figure
4
6, N=l for 1 < K <_ 2 which implies that — < K _< 2 for profitable pre-
-22-
4
emption. Pre-emption is not profitable for 1 < K <^ -r- *n this
Q
example, all segments of size greater than K* = — allow profitable pre-
emption. Under this critical size K*, profitable pre-emption is pos-
sible only in disjoint ranges of segment size K.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed an analytical framework to help
strategists analyze segment level pre-emption of competitive entry.
Using this framework, we have derived general rules for choosing the
necessary and sufficient number of products and their positions for
pre-emption. Our analysis considered changes in segment size and
examined positioning strategies with both growth and decline in segment
demand.
Three different strategic perspectives with respect to competitive
entry and research information were identified and the resulting prod-
uct positions were evaluated for both pre-emption and profitability.
Our results were shown to be generalizable to any consumer density
distribution, to cases where synergistic effects of product positions
apply, and to cases where potential entrants might have fixed costs of
entry other than that of the pre-emptor.
Extensions of this research are required principally in (i) con-
sidering higher characteristic spaces, and (ii) considering multiple
segments simultaneously.
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Footnotes
By two related characteristics, we mean the existence of a tech-
nological constraint of the form f(w,z) = 1, where w and z are the
levels of the two characteristics of any product and f is a horaeo-
morphism.
2
Runyon (1982, pp. 355) states: "Many markets can be segmented on
the basis of price; the automobile market is a prime example. Used in
this way, pricing strategy is an effective device for appealing to a
particular economic segment of the total market."
3
In general the characteristic space (relevant for this segment)
may be the interval [a,bj with a total segment demand KL, i.e., the
KL
consumer density function f(<S) = t— . This is readily transformed by
t KL. A KL(a+b) , . , KL KL, . „a = {——)cl 7777 r to a rescaled space I rr, —;rl with a consumerb-a 2(b-a) 2 2
density function f(a)=l and segment demand KL. This transformation is
linear and uniquely invertible. Therefore, given a position a in
rescaled space the corresponding characteristic value can be uniquely
and easily obtained.
4
Gould managers are responsible for a 40 percent ROI in the first
year of sales in a new market or of a new product (Kotler, 1984).
We use the terms product and brands interchangeably throughout
our discussion.
For non-integral values of K, the general rules hold using the
next higher integer to K instead of K.
A heuristic argument demonstrating incentive is as follows: Con-
sider a current segment size K, and corresponding incumbent pre-emptive
-24-
products to be n
1
in number. Let the segment size increase to K„ and
the corresponding number of products for pre-emption be n . The dif-
ference in profits for incumbent between pre-empting any competitor and
allowing competitors to enter only (n„-n ) appropriately positioned
products is
{(K
2
-n
2
) - (K
1
-n
1
)}L - {(8^-^) - (K^n^jL.
The first term describes profit change under incumbent pre-emption.
The second describes the incumbent's profit change under competitive
entry and resulting incumbent market share 0. Approximating by
—
,
n
2
"
2
this profit change can be expressed as (n~-n, ) [— - 1J . From Figure 6
it is clear that K„ > n„, implying that the incumbent has an incentive
to pre-empt competition.
Eaton and Lipsey (1979) also show the existence of such an incentive
to pre-empt in the context of a continuous time model with discounted
cash flow.
Q
For a segment size K+6, i.e., with demand (K+6)L (where 0<6<1),
K+6
any two adjacent products will be (-jt+tO , as will be the distance from
both segment ends to their corresponding closest product. ( g . ,
)
L < L,
this strategist will introduce K products, and the distance between
•K+l
K+l
which satisfies both conditions CI and C2 of the general cases in
Section 4.1.
9
If F(a) is continuous, then the integral is the usual Riemanian
one. Otherwise, one could use the more general Lebesgue integral
KL KL
over the measurable space [- *— , tj— ] .
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